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BLACK AND WHITE MARRIAGE PATTERNS:

WHY SO DIFFERENT?

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the process of entry into first marriage in the
United States for blacks and whites.

These patterns are analyzed and compared

using a statistical model suitable for the analysis of survey data on age at
marriage for cohorts who have yet to complete their marriage experience.
Estimates of this model reveal three main differences between the first
marriage patterns of black women and white women:
blacks marry than whites, (2)

(1)

lower proportions of

the proportion of women who ever-marry has

declined substantially across cohorts of black women but only modestly across
cohorts of white women, and (3)

increased education is associated with a

reduced probability of ever-marrying for white women, but an increased proba
bility for blacks.

We then explore three alternative explanations for the

observed differences in the marriage patterns of black and white women.
Overall, we are able to demonstrate the consistency of the racial differences
in nuptiality patterns with our three alternative explanations.

BLACK AND WHITE MARRIAGE PATTERNS:

WHY so DI~FERENT?
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Introduction
For some time there has been an awareness that marriage rates, and
family formation in general, have differed for whites and blacks.

In

1965, the Moynihan report saw black family structure disintegrating and
the black community enmeshed in a "tangle of pathology".

Moynihan and

other proponents of this view (Bernard, 1966; Rainwater, 1966) found
that many problems faced by blacks, such as crime, delinquency, and the
lack of upward mobility were due to a matriarchal culture and high rates
of illegitimacy and marital dissolution.
The main objections to this view were (1) to its attribution of the
"pathological" behavior of lower-class bl~ck families to individuals
rather than to defects in the social system, J2) to the view of family
structure as the cause of black-white inequality (Rainwater and Yancey,
19671, and (3) to the adoption of an attitude of "blaming the victim"
(Hill, 1972).

Some sought to show that ·while some differences between

white and black family structure exist, these are small when one
Stressing the

controls for socioeconomic differences (Heisse, 1975).

basic sameness of black and white families, this approach assumes that
marriage is valued to a high degree among blacks but factors such as
higher rates of unemployment prevent marriages from taking place or
contribute to their dissolution.

Another perspective holds that black

-

families ought not to be viewed as deficient when compared to the norms
of the white middle class (Hill, 1972; Nobles, 1974), but instead ougnt
to be seen as a unique cultural form valid on its own terms.

Both of

tnese approaches question tne use of the nuclear family as a stanaard
against wnich blacK families ought to be compared.

Ratner, to a certain

extent eacn argues that the extenoed family characterizes many families
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and therefore merits attention in its own right.
The first approach sees the greater tenaency of black families to
become extended and to rely on kin networks for financial and social
support as a rational and creative response to difficult economic
situations (Stack, 1974).

However, some view the extended family as

Jess a creative adaptation to poverty than as a fundamental institution
of black culture (Aschenbrenner, 1973i Shimkin et al., 1978) whose
importance is equally evident among middle-class and lower-class blacK
families (McAdoo, 1978).

Each of these perspectives suggests that

within this type of family structure, there may be incentives and
pressures not to form families along nuclear lines and in particular to
reject marriage (Aschenbrenner, 1973; Stack, 1974; Martin and Martin,
1978).

Much contemporary research on the family is motivated by an
awa~eness that patterns of marriage and family formation in the United
States have changed dramatically in recent years.

Trends such as the

thirty percent decline in the first marriage rates of women during the
twenty years between 1963 and 1982, the two-year increase in the median
age at first marriage during the same period (National Center for Health
Statistics, 1985), and the sharp decrease in the proportion of the
population living in husband/wife families over the past twenty-five
years have prompted some observers to argue that marriage as a social
institution has been waning (Espenshade, 1985).

Other scholars

emphasize that marriage has remained an essential fact of American
family life (Davis, 1972i Kitagawa, 1979; Rodgers and Thornton, 1985).
Despite factors maKing single life more attractive--for example, the
greater financial independence of women and changing mores regarding
cohabitation--many researchers (Thornton and Freeaman, 1983) argue that
4

marriage is unlikely to lose its preeminence as a form of union,
~inally, there are those who note that many of these trends have been
Rodgers and Thornton (1985)

much more acute among blacks than whites.

found that the decline in marriage probabilities among whites and blacks
which began in the 1950s started earlier and lasted longer for blacks,
resulting in markedly lower probabilities for them.

Evidence such as

this leads some to speculate that marriage maintains its centrality for
most white Americans but does so to

a

lesser and lesser extent for

blacks (Cheri in, 1981).
Recent concern with differences in black and white family
organization is not expressed solely in the debate over whether
oemographic patterns such as differential rates of marriage are rooted
in class position or cultural inheritances,

Many have found it

important to examine economic well-being in conjunction with family
composition (Wilson, 1982; Moynihan, 1985).

The aecline in husband/wife

families goes hand in hand with the explosive growth of female-headed
families:

By 1980, 12 percent of white families and 40 percent of black

families were headed by women not currently married, representing a
significant increase from figures a decade earlier {9 and 28 percent,
respectively),

Because such families tend to be most impoverished and

are increasingly headed by single never-married women (Darity and Myers,
1983), it becomes imperative to examine the reasons behind declining
rates of marriage. 2
In the present paper, we consider questions about how black and
white Americans structure their families and how the processes by,which
they do so differ.

Our analysis reveals much sharper blacK-white

aitferences than previously iaentified.
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Many prior analyses are

inadequate, as they rely on period measures,cwhic~ pro~ide little
insight into the behavioral patterns that they presumably summarize.
These measures fail to describe the marriage ~rocess fro~ its most
natural perspective, namely, the life cycle or cohort perspective ..
The Hodel

We apply the Coale-McNeil marriage model (described in detail in
the Appendix) to cohort data on marriage patterns of black and white
women of various educational attainment levels.

Coale (1971) observed

the existence of an empirically regular structure in the pattern of
entry into first marriage for female cohorts in a wide range of
In addition, Coale showed that the

countries and time periods.

structure of these patterns could be well-summarized by three
statistics:

the mean age at first marriage, the standard deviation of

age· at first m~rriage, and the proportion ever-marrying in 1he cohort.
The wide variety of first marriage patterns that can be cap~ured by the.
Coale-McNeil model is displayed in Figure 1.
By applying this model, we are able to infer the mean age at
marriage and the proportion of women who will ultimately marry from
survey data on cohorts who have yet to complete their marriag~
experience.

That is, because the model is parametric, we can fit the

model to the marital history experienced to date by a young cohort and
then extrapolate _the remainder, or the future course, of that cohort's
marital history.

Bloom and Bennett (1985} have shown, Using artificial

truncation experiments in which the model is fit to several purposely
abbreviated data sets, that the model performs well in extrapolation.
Thus by fitting the model to recent survey aa·ta, we can determine how
marriage patterns have changed across cohorts.
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The Data

Our analysis of marri_age patterns of American women is based on
data from the June 1982 Current Population Survey (CPS).

The CPS is a

nationwide sample survey conducted monthly by the Bureau of the Census.
It involves detailed personal interviews in about 70,000 households
during which information on a variety of demographic, social, and
economic variables is recorded.
In the June 1982 CPS, the standard set of questions was
supplemented with a retrospective marital history module.

Included on

the supplementary survey instrument was a question on age at first
marriage that was asked of all women aged 18 to 15.

Unfortunately,

there are few retrospective covariates in the CPS that could sensibly be
hypothesized to affect age at marriage.
the ·following two variables:

However, we have constructed

race (black, white) and education at time

·of survey (for blacks, less than high school, high school, greater than
high school; and for whites, because we have a greater number of
Gbservations, less than high school, high school, some college, and at
least college).

.

Although the CPS data set permits estimation of only

two covariate effects, it is extremely useful in this study because (a)
it refers to all women, (b) it includes. an exceptionally large number of
observations, and Cc) it is quite recent.
Results

Table 1 reports parameter estimates associated with five cohorts of
women for blacks and whites separately.

For each cohort we allow the

mean age at first marriage (~) and the proportion who will ever-marry
(E) to vary with educational attainment.
The results indicate that differences exist between clack and white
7

marriage patterns and that over time these differences have become
suostantial.

Consider first the group of women with less than high

school education at the time of the survey.

The percentages expecteo to

ever-marry have fallen across cohorts for both white and black women.
Ninety-seven percent of white women aged 45 to 49 are expected to marry
at least once in their lifetime, with a mean age of first marriage of
19.8 years.

Approximately 93 percent of their 25 to 29 year-old

counterparts are expected to marry and, on average, at roughly the same
age, 19.7 years.
following figures:

The same comparison.for black women yields the
The mean age at first marriage decreased across

cohorts only trivially, from 21.2 to 21,1 years.

More importantly,

_however, the proportion of women expected to ultimately marry plummeted
from 89 to 57 percent.
Education, as wou-ld be expected, bears an important relationship to
the parameters of the marriage distribution.

For both blacks and

whites, higher education is associated with a higher mean age at
marriage.

White 25 to 29 year-old women wt:io have had at least a college

education are expected to marry 4.1 years later, on average, than those
who have not graduated high school.

Among blacks in this age group with

more than a high school education, the association i~ similar, with a
magnitude of 1.6 years.
Surprising, however, is our finding concerning the relationship
between educational atta_inment.and proportions ever-marrying.

The

magnitude is substantial for both races, however the direction is
different.

For the young white cohort, a college education is

associated with fifteen percent fewer women (78 percent) expected to
marry.

The magnitude of this relationship has risen dramatically over
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time, increasing from under seven percent for the

◄5

to

◄9

year-olds.

Among black women, a high school education or beyond is consistently
positively associated with proportions ever-marrying.

The fact that all

ten of the relevant coefficients for black women are positive (although
only three are significantly s~) suggests that black women follow a very
different family formation pattern than their white counterparts.
It is further illuminating to use a life table approach to analyze
these marriage patterns.

Recognizing that marriage, rather than death,

can serve as the decrement of interest, we can derive a set of marriage
probabilities that are analogous to probabilities that arise from life
table analyses.

In particular, we derive the probability that a woman

will ever~marry given that she has never married by exact age x;

This

\

is obviously analogous to the life table value q, except for the fact
that some pe~ple never do marry, whe~eas everyone must eventually d)e.
These life table probabilities are graphed in Figure 1 for various race
education combinations within the cohort of women aged 25 to 29 in 1982.
It is clear, for example, that the probability of ever-marrying is lower
for blacks than whites at all ages.
Table 2 presents these first marriage probabilities for selected
ages.

A few figures are worth noting.

Among 25 to 29 year-old whites

we see that from age 25 onward, marriage patterns are essentially
identical for the two education.groups.

That is, the less-educated

marry in significantly greater numbers than the more-educated in the
early years, however after everyone passes their early twenties the
probability that a woman not yet married will ultimately marry is
invariant to educational attainment.
From the table it is apparent that 45 to 49 year-olds have higher
marriage probabilities at every age than do their 25 to 29 year-old·
9

counterparts.

This reflects the fact that the proportions expected to

ever marry are higher for the older groups.
Among 25 to_29 year-old white women, those who have attained their
25th birthday without ever-marrying still have a greater than 50 percent
chance of marrying in the future.

Among black women of the same age,

the chances of the more educated women marrying are only one in four,
and for the less educated marrying, only one in six.

If

a

woman reaches

age 45 and has not yet married, it is clear from Table 2 that her
chances of ever-marrying are generaliy extremely slim.
Discussion
The profound black-white differences in nuptiality patterns
revealed by the data raise three important questions:

(1) Why, in

general, do lower proportions of blacks marry than whites; (2) Why has
there been a pronounced decline across cohorts of the percentage of
black women who will ever-marry; and (3) Why is increased education
associated with a reduced probability of women ever-marrying for whites
but an increased probability for blacks?
We consider various arguments that might account for trends and
differentials in nuptiality:

those relating to the "marriage squeeze",

out-of-wedlock childbearing, and economic well-being.
First, the issue of. imbalances in male/female ratios provides a
partial clue to understanoing the different proportions marrying by
race.

Declining marriage rates for both white and black women are

commonly attributea to a marriage squeeze.

One aspect of the squeeze·

relates to the fact that at some age women begin to outnumoer men in the
population.

For white women, the imoalance begins arouno age thirty.

For black women this occurs as much as a decaoe earlier in life, in part
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reflecting the hign rates of death and incarceration among young black
men.

Further compounding the squeeze is the fact that women hove

traditionally tended to marry men who are slightly older.

Tnis tenaency

is a greater problem among blacks because tne black population has grown
faster over time than the wnite population. 3

Those women who were oorn

auring the upward trend of births in the 1950's and early 1960's are now
caught in a bind.

There are simply too few men in the older cohorts.

It should be the case that the marriage squeeze is most severe for women
30 to 34 in 1982.

However, as Table 1 shows, we find that 25 to 29

year-old women, both white ana black, are less likely to ultimately
marry than 30 to 34 year-olds.

Thus wnile tne marriage squeeze

undouotedly is useful in explaining some of the differential in marriage
rates between wnite and black women, it can only partially explain tne
recent, rapid decrease in the percentage who will ever-marry~
A

second argument which helps to explain race differences in

marriage patterns centers on the higher rates of out-of-wedlock
childbearing among blacks.

Typically, marriage has been considered one

of the steps in the life cycle that signifies the transition to
aoulthood (Hogan and Kitagawa, 1985).

Its decline, particularly among

blacks, may signal a turn towards alternative paths, in particular
towards single parenthood,
Some contend that high illegitimacy rates among blacks is partly
the result of lower stigma attached to out-of-wedlock childbirth
(Bernard, 1966; Furstenberg, 1981).

It is also worth noting that blac1<

women are more likely to have children at younger ages than white women
!Bloom, 1982; Bloom and Trussell, 1984).

This is related to the younger

age at wnicn black women i-nitiate sexual intercourse.

11

By age 15, ao-0ut

one-eighth of white women are sexually experienced as compared with
almost 40 percent of their black counterparts (Zelnik and Kantner,
1977).

Furstenberg (1981) estimates that black women begin sexual

activity about three years earlier than whites.

Because bl~ck women are

younger when they begin sexual relations, they are less likely to use
contraception and thus are more likely to become pregnant.

The earlier

timing of the first birth among blacks may be significantly related to
the timing and incidence of marriage insofar as it diminishes her
opportunities for marriage.
Mothers under 18 are much more unlikely than 18 or 19 year-olds to
legitimate their births by marriage because they are unprepared for that
adult role; either they are emotionally unready or they lack the
financial resources for a viable marriage.

Among black teenagers, the

majority of oirths occur to the.youngest group, those 15 to 17 years of
age, while for white teenag•rs births are found overwhelming~y among the
18 to 19 year-olds,

The latter age group coincides with a number of

transitions in the life cycle, such as leaving school, and acquiring a
first job (Teachman and Polonko, 1984); therefore, those in this age
group are more likely than those younger to legitimate their births.
Finally, Furstenberg and Crawford (1978) find that teenage mothe~i who
do not marry are economically better off than those who do.

In

concurrence with Stack (1974), they suggest that the teenage mother who
leaves home to some extent sacrifices the emotional and financial
support available from her family.
Although these arguments provide some explanations of why blacks
may be more likely or fino it more acceptable than whites to forego
marriage, it is important to note that one cannot use declining
legitimation ratios to explain declining marriage rates; tney are simply
12

two perspectives of the same underlying phenomenon.

Thus we must search

for indepenaent explanations of the marriage decline.
Economic' analysis plays an important role in explaining differences
in patterns of marriage, recognizing that a woman may choose, or oe
forced into, any one of a number of marital statuses according to her
economic resources.

A particularly promising area of inquiry focuses on

the relative levels of white and black male unemployment.

For example,

blacK employment relative to white employment has declined, as has the
•·

· ratio of black to white famili income (Munnell, 1978; McQueen, 1978).
Many authors have found that the lower rate of participation of black
men in the labor force is reflected in the lower incidence of marriage
among blacks (StacK, 1974; Glick, 1981; Reid, 1982) and in the rapid
growth of black families neaded by women (Center for the Study of Social
Policy, 1984).

Certainly, unemployment is a reason for deferring

marriage and the longer people postpone marrying, the more likely they
are to forego it entirely, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.
Although the above studies are suggestive of a aeteriorating
economic situation among blacKs, the fact that educational attainment is
not accounted for implicitly assumes homogeneity within racial groups.
We estimate a few simple regression models in order to determine not
only how blacks have farea economically relative to whites in recent
years, but also whether trends and differentials in race differ by
educational attainment.

Economic data are obtained from the March

Current Population Surveys of 1968 through 1984.
examine three dependent variables:

In particular, we

(1) unemployment rates CU), (2)

expected annual per capita earnings of those employee full-time year
rouna (E), and (3) a crude measure of expectea per capita earnings of
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all members of the labor force 1 that is 1 those employed and unemployed,
were all to work full-time year round (the product of E and 1-U).
Table Ja focuses on 20 to 24 year-olds since these are the years of
peaK marriageability.

Three sets of regression coefficients are

reported for each sex, corresponding to the three dependent variables.
The indepenoent variables in ali moaels include all main effects, and
two-way and three-way interaction effects of race {black=l, white=O),
education (less than, equal to, and more than high school graduate), ano
time.

Dummy variables for all but one year were incorporated in the

model as well in order to capture buiiness cycle effects, although the
corresponding coefficients have been omitted from the table.
It is apparent that, for both sexes, unemployment has increased
substantially over time among blacks and the less-eoucated, relative to
whites and those who are better-educated.

Similarly, expected annual

earnings of all mal•s in the labo~ force are decreasing over time more
for blacKs and for those less-educated than for other groups.

Less

educated women of both races are singled out for lower earnings,
although no decline over time is apparent.

As shown in.Table 3b,

supplementary regression analyses referring to 25 to 29 year-olds paint
much the same picture.

In short, Table 3 tells a dramatic story:

Less

educated young black men and women are doubly jeopardized by their race
and educational status.

Their relative economic circumstances are

generally poor and have deteriorated significantly with the passage of
time. 4
Taken together, the rising rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing ana
the worsening labor market e~periar:ce among less-educatea olacKs may oe
seen as evioence of growing oifferentiation of blacks by class.
Numerous others have ooserved this segregation as a movement into an
14

unGerclass--those permanently consigned to poverty and with little hope
of uoward mooility--and the worKing and middle classes (Munnell, 1978;
Glasgow, 1981; Auletta, 1982; Farley and Bianchi, 1983; Hogan and
Kitagawa, 1985).
For the underclass, whicn has been estimated to comprise almost
one-third of the black populat•ion, movement out of poverty is becoming
less likely because educational criteria are increasingly important for
mooil ity and because structural changes in the post-war ~ccinomy prevent
blacks from following typicAl patterns of upward mobility (Wilson, 1978;
Harrington, 1985).

An expanding underclass, then, whose members are

unable to accumulate sufficient resources for marriage, helps to explain
the sharply declining rates of marriage among black women.
The issue of marriage avoidance may be directly related to class,
in particular, an underclass (Kelly, 1985).

Stress associated with the

persistent poverty experienced by members of this group may lead both to
a reliance on kin networks and to the foregoing of marriage.

In

addition, even after controlling for education and other bac1<grouna
characteristics, blacks have substantially higher rates of marital
dissolution than whites (Menken et ·al., 1981 ),

A woman who sees divorce

as common among her friends may interpret her prospects as discouraging
enough to dissuade her from marrying.

The higher dissolution rates may,

in turn, be due to relatively difficult economic circumstances faced by
blacks and to the availability of supportive kin networks;

Black women

seeking a more stable type of familial organization may rely on, ratner

•

than marriage, a network of kin which pools and excnanges economic ana
tinancial resources (Aschenorenner, 1973; :itac1<, 1974i.

If her

potential marriage cannot offer a young woman more security tnan canner
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present kin network, then she may see little reason to marry (Martin and
t~.:!rtin, 1978).
It is not, however, simply the person marrying who considers the
economic advantages.

StacK's (1974) study of a midwestern blacK

community discusses the potential conflicts that exist between marriage
and loyalty to kin.

Citing the example of a young woman who receiveo

great pressure from her network not to marry, Stack shows that memoers
of kin groups may fear losing the resources and contributions of a
member ano thus oppose a marriage that would take her out of the
network.
Arguments presented aoove lead some to the conclusion that for
olacks, kinship ties are a more important family bond than ties to the
nuclear family and that the extended family structure has become
appreciably more important relative to the nuclear family structure over
the past twenty years (Cher1in, 1981).

Extensive and growing commitment

to extended families could also explain part of the difference we found
by race in marriage rates.

However, some researchers taKe the position

that extended families are, in fact, a declining form (Bianchi ano
Farley, 1979).
The disagreement over the relative importance of the extended
family appears to stem from differences in which segments of the
population are unaer consideration and how extension i5 measured.

We

have already suggested that extension is a phenomenon associated with
the underclass.

Others hold that the extended family network has become

a characteristic, cultural feature of all black families (Aschenbrenner,
1973; McAooo,· 1978).

There is, however, some indication that the degree

of extension varies by class, ano in particular, that witnin networKs,
requests placeo and oemands recei~eo are less numerous for those who
16

have belonged to the middle class for over a generation (McAdoo, 1978).
This suggests a lesser commitment to the extendea form among the middle
class.

Evidence provided by Tienaa and Angel (1985), demonstrating that

extension appears to be more common among female-headed families of all
races while increasing educational attainment works to discourage
extension, lends support to this perspective.

This view suggests that

while extension may be declining overall, for the poorest individuals it
remains an important way of coping with poverty.
The question still remains:

Why is increased education associated

with lower proportions of women ever-marrying among whites but higher
proportions among blacks?

Clearly, education has a particularly strong

effect on the propensity to marry.

For highly educated white women, it

appears that this trend of marriage deferral is becoming one of
_foregoing marriage entirely.

When educational levels are considered,

Cherlin's (1981) statement, "it is unlikely that the lifetime
proportions (of young adults) marrying will fall below the historical
minimum of 90 percent" must be qualified.

As noted above, for the

youngest white group with at least a college education, the proportion
expected to marry is just 78 percent.

Increased education may open

career opportunities that are viewed as alternatives to marriage.
Because women may now expect to work throughout their adult lives, they
may postpone marriage in order to invest in the education that will
allow them to obtain better jobs in the future.

However, marriage

foregone among black women is related to a very different set of
circumstances.
It is important to taKe note, once again, of the economic aisparity
between Jess- ana more-educated blacks that was revealea in Taole 3.

17
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The severe economic distress, as measured by unemployment and earnings,
:nat is associated with less-educated blacKs most likely plays a part in
preventing marriage in this group from occurring (Rodgers and Thornton,
1985).
While out-of-wedlock childbearing, as discussea above, doubtless
reduces a woman's marriageability, here too it is elucidating to examine
the prevalence of illegitimacy by class,

For example, does premarital

childbearing occur disproportionately among women whose parents were
less-educated?

Table 4 shows, of those women whose mothers achieuea

less or more than a high school education, the percentage from various
cohorts who premaritally gave birth.

The results clearly indicate 5 that

premarital childbearing is closely related to class, to the extent, of
course, that parent's education correlates with class.

This is

consistent with the findings by Hogan et al. (1985), ~hich reveal that
use of contraception at first intercourse by black adolescents varies
strongly by social class.

Adolescents of higher social class are much

more likely to contracept than others and are consequently more likely
to be effective users in the future.
Economic hardship and premarital childbearing, then, both of which
have a negative impact on the propensity to marry, are concentrated
among the less-educated black population.

Thus the positive

coefficient, seen in Table 1, relating to proportions ever-marrying
among better-educated blacks is primarily a reflection of the
extraordinarily poor marriage prospects ot their less-educated
counterparts.
Some nave argued that patterns of family formation among miaale
class olac1< women are likely to have rnore in common with those of white
women than with those of lower status blac1<s (Ryder and westoft, 1971;
18

To the extent that education can serve as a proxy for

Johnson1 1979).

class, this argument is borne out in our analysis.

We observe a partial

convergence of marriage patterns among blacks and whites of the higher
ror the better-educateo olack women 1 chances- of

eoucation groups.

marriage are generally greater than those tor their less-eaucated
counterparts.

How then do we account for the still substantial

difference ~hat exists among black and white better-eoucated women?
For some time, scholars have noted the shortage of black men
relative to black women (Jackson, 1971; McOueen 1 1978) and many have
argued that the shortage of black men eligiole for marriage is one of
the reasons oehind lower black marriage rates (Cox, 1940; Reid, 1982;
Guttentag and Secord, 1983).

This may provide a partial explanation of

lower marriage rates among better-educated black women compared to their
white counterparts;
Cultural assumptions by both men and women about the desirable
eoucational level of a spouse may also be part of the answer.

If it is

felt that wives should have a lower educational status than their
husbands, some among the growing numoers of highly educated women of
both _races may be oecoming, in some sense, less marriageable.

For white

women, the proportion with a college education has been increasing since
the 1960's while the figure for white men has been fluctuating but
aeclining overall.

By the mid-1980's, parity will be achieved between

the number of men and women receiving degrees (Farley, 1984).

Black

women, on the other hand, continue to outnumoer black men in the number
of college aegrees receivea although the differential peaked in 1980
(McGhee, 1984).

Both white and black women with a college education

appear to oe experiencing a scarcity of a suitable partners, but tne
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situation is worse among black women.
either

(a)

It is possible, however, should

the recent trend towards greater parity in black male and

female college enrollment continues or (b) norms, sucn as those
concerning interracial marriage or "marrying oown" in educational terms,
change, that larger proportions of highly eoucated black women will
marry.
Summary and Conclusions

The analysis presented here indicates that there is no simple
explanation for declining marriage rates of women across cohorts ana for
differences in rates oy race.

Across every cohort-eaucatio n group for

wnicn we can compare whites and blacKs, the proportion of black women
who are expected to ever-marry is smaller than the corresponding
There are a number of factors--demogr aphicJ

proportion of white women.

economic, .and cul~ural--that play a part in explaining differenc~s in
marriage patterns, but these do not affect al I women identically.
I

BlacK women seeKing to marry are hindered simply by sheer numoers
of available men.

A marriage squeeze that is more severe for blacks

than whites results from a oepressed sex ratio in the ages of peak
marriageaoility .

High death rates and incarceration of young blacK men

contribute to the sex ratio imbalance and most likely disproportiona tely
affect the poorest, less-educated groups.
women,

a

For better-eaucated black

scarcity of suitaole partners is partially the result of

greater numoers of black women than men completing higher education.
The relationship between educational attainment and marriage rates
is particularly notaole.

For better-educated blacK and white women

tnere is a tenaency toward convergence in marriage patterns.

Among the

youngest ccnort ot col lege-eoucatea wnite women, fully 15 percent fewer
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will ever-marry (a remarkably low 78 percent) than will white women with
less than nigh school education.

On the other hand, better-educated

black women of all cohorts teno to be more likely to ever-marry than
olacKs who do not graduate high scnool.

Tnis is consistent with

observations by some that the cultural habits of middle-class blacks are
more similar to those of the white middle class than to those of other
blacks in general.

However, the positive relationship between education

and propensity to marry among blacks may be viewed, in large part, as
stemming from the exceptionally poor marriage prospects of less-educatea
blac1<s.
Among women with less education, the percentages who will ever
marry sharply differ by race.

The proportion of white women expected to

ever-marry nas decreased only slightly from 97 to 93 percent for the
oldest and youngest cohorts, respectively.

Across cohorts of black

women, however, .the propensity to ever-marry bas fallen precipitously
across cohorts.
marry.

Only 58 percent among the youngest cohort can expect to

This is partly

a

reflection of the poverty experienced by many

blac1<s in this group which makes it more difficult to enter into a
secure marriage.

The extended family structure may be a more stable

form of familial organization for many poor black families than the
nuclear structure, discouraging women from marrying unless marriage can
offer them greater economic security.
Our economic analysis reveals that unemployment and expected annual
earnings are worsening among Jess-educated black men and women in recent
years relative to other subgroups of the population.

This deteriorating

economic situation hints at the expansion of a black underclass, whose
memoers would most likely find it difficult to affora marriage.

The

erosion of economic opportunity among less-eaucated blacKs is consistent
21

witn_the sharply declining marriage rates that we observe.
Firm evidence that would enable us to conclusively determine
whether low marriage rates among blacks reflect a shift in attitudes
toward the institution of marriage (i.e., a voluntary shift) or, rather,
a forced· rejection of marriage is not currently available.

Efforts

should oe made to collect direct data that would focus on a young
woman's decision to marry and bear children--exploring with her the
various options that sne may have had at critical junctures in her life.
Our study, however, strongly suggests the involuntary nature of the
decreasing propensity to marry.
We began this paper by considering a numoer of reflections on the
centrality of marriage in American life.

The analysis presented here

indicates that it is not possible to make either a categorical statement
that marriage remains a state that most women will enter.at some point
in their adult lives or that Americans are abandoning marriage as a
social institution.

Rather, it appears that for many women, especially

tnose who are white or better-educated and black, marriage continues to
play a significant role in the transition to adulthood.
black women present a·much different story.

Less-educated

For this group, it appears

that marriage occupies increasingly little place in the life cycle.
In addition to the lack of suitable partners, which to a varying extent
affects all women, poorly educated black women face a unique set of
circumstances.

First, the economic situation of many of tnese women

effectively prevents marriage from occurring.

Second, the earlier age

at which they initiate sexual intercourse and the concomitant higher
level of early out-of-wedlock childbearing aiminishes the likelihood of
ever-marrying.

For this group, it is not likely that marriage will
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regain its primacy unless childbearing _is delayed and prospects for
e~ployment among young black men and women orighten.

'
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Appendix:

The Coale-McNei l Harriage Hodel

The Coale-McNei l marriage model is based on the observation by
Coale (1971) that age oistribution s of first marriages are structurall y
As shown by Coale, these

similar in different populations .

distributio ns tend to be smooth, unimodal, skewed to the right, and have
density close to zero below age fifteen and above age fifty.
Coale also observed that the differences in age-at-marr iage
distributio ns across female populations are largely accounted for oy
differences in their means, their standard deviations, and their
cumulative values at the older ages.

The particular form of the model

that we shall use, which characteriz es any observed distributio n, was
derived by Rodriguez and Trussell (1980):
·E-

g(a)

=

a~

a~

- 1.2813 exp(-1.145 (---

+

0.805) - exp{-1.896 (--- + 0,805)}] , Cl)

a

cr

a

where g(a) is the proportion mafrying at age a in the observed
population andµ, a, and~ are, respectivel y, the mean and standard
deviation of age at marriage (for those who ever-marry) and the
proportion ever-marryi ng.
It is interesting to note that Coale and McNeil's model
distributio n of first marriage by age arises as the convolution of an
infinite number of mean-correc ted exponential distribution s whose
parameters increase in arithmetic sequence.

Moreover, Coale and McNeil

have shown that this distributio n is very closely approximate d by the
convolution of the three exponential distributio ns with the largest
exponents (in the infinite sequence) and a normal distributio n.

This

latter property of the Coale-McNei l model gives rise to an appealing
24

oenavioral interpretation of the model.

According to this

ir:terpretation, each of the tnree exponential distributions
characterizes the waiting time between two premarital stages (e.g.,
between the commencement of dating and meeting one's_ultimate spouse,
between meeting the spouse and engagement, and between engagement ana
marriage); the normal distribution descrioes the age at entry of women
into the marriage market.

This interpretation received some empirical

support in the original paper by Coale and McNeil in a direct test using
data on the length of time that a sample of French husbands and wives
knew each other before marrying.
Subsequent research has done little to confirm or deny the
behavioral interpretation of the model althougn a number of studies have
provided additional support for the ability of the moael to fit first
marriage data (see, e.g., Ewbank, 1974; Rodriguez and Trussell, 1980;
Trussell, 1980; Trussell and Bloom, 1983; Bloom and Bennett, 1985).

To

some extent, the good fit may be due to the fl~xibility of three
parameter models to fit distributions that are smooth, unimodal and
skewed to the right.

It is also likely that the Coale-McNeil model

performs well because it is based on the marriage rates for an actual
population.

In other words, even though the true model generating a

given distribution of marriage rates is unknown, the Coale-McNeil model
may fit well (and better than a purely theoretical model such as that
due to Heroes [1972J or a purely ad hoc empirical model such as that due
to Keeley (1979]) because the true model is captured implicitly in the
rates on which it (i.e., the Coale-McNeil model

j

is based.

The parameters of the above equation may be estimated in a variety
of ways aepenaing on the nature of the availaole data.
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In the present

app1ication we work with survey data on age at marriage for individua1
women and use a maximum likelihood estimator.

Thus, for our sample of

all women (i.e., a random samp1e of ever-married and never-married women
in a cohort), we estimateµ, cr, and Eby maximizing the following log
likelihood function:

log LA= Hog g(a~

I

µ,cr,E)

+ E_log [l-G(a~·1 µ,cr,E)],
iEM

iEM

( 2)

m.
where ai 1s age at first marriage for those individuals who have married
s
.
(the set M), ai is age ~t the time of survey for never-married
individuals (the set M), and G(•) is the cumulative distribution
function for the density function g(•) expressed in equation

(1),

Observe that the second summation on the right hand side of equation (2)
accounts for censoring which will be present to the extent that not all
women who ultimately do marry will have done so by the time of the
survey.
Following Trussell and Bloom (1983), we extend this model to allow
for covariate effects by specifying a functional relationship between
the parameters of the model distribution and the covariates.

For

example, we may specify these relationships in linear form as follows:

. µi

= . XI a.
:i

cri

=

v:s
1

. Ei

=

w:y
].

where i denotes individual i,

x

1

,

v1 ,

and

w1

are the vector values of

characteristics of that individual that determ~ne respectively µi' cr 1 ,
and E., and a., 8, and y are the associated parameter vectors to be
1

estimated.
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NOTES

1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual
meetings of the American Sociological Association, Washington, DC, 28
August 1985, and the Population Association of America, Boston, MA, 30
March 1985. We would like to thank Arland Thornton for helpful comrr:ients
and McKinley Blackburn, Margaret Greene, Cecilia Rouse, and Paul Wolfson
for excellent research assistance.
2 A focus of many analyses is the economic factors that give rise to
the growth of female-headed households. Census Bureau data show that
the greatest increases in female-headed families have come from never
married women. In 1970, such households made up 0.3 percent of all
white families with children under eighteen in the home; in 1980, 1.4
percent, and by 1984, 2~7 percent. To be sure, these are substantial
increases, and in proportionate terms, of greater magnitude than changes
in the figures for black families. Yet families with never-married
parents represent a very small minority of white families. By contrast,
a large proportion, 28.1 percent, of black families in 1984 were heaaed
by never-married women; this figure also represents~ dramatic increase
from 1980 and 1970 levels of 16,3 and 5.4 percent, respectively _(Bureau
of the Census, 1984),
On~ issue that has dominated the literature on increases in female
headship is the role of government transfer payments, notably AFDC.
Suen studies suggesting that welfare contributes to changes in family
structure are at best only partially successful. Danziger et al. (1982)
concluded that actual increases in female-headship between 1968 and 1975
were mucn larger than. could be explained by financial aspects, including
welfare benefits, that mfght affect the economic well-being of female
heads.
Ross and Sawhill (1975) found that expanded welfare benefits have a
positive but small effect on the proportion of non-white women who head
households. They also noted that, of women who remarry, blacks take one
and a half times as long as their white counterparts to find a new
partner, To the extent that the reasons for delaying remarriage opera~e
to delay first marriages as well (i.e., women can afford not to be
married), then we might argue that increases in welfare benefits could
have slight long-term consequences for the number of women who marry,
whether directly or indirectly.
3 For example, the black population grew almost twice as fast as the
white population between 1_970 and 1980 (approximately 1.7 versus 0,9
percent annually).
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4 It should be noted that all of these dependen~ variables relate to
inaividuals in the labor force. If educational attainment of blacks
relative to whites improved over time, and if those individuals with the
best labor market prospects were those attending school, then the
estimates in Table 3 would be misleading. We explored this possibility
by re-estimating models, including school enrollment rates as an
independent variable. However, we found no support for thi~ hypothesis.
5The story behind Table 4 is much the same when we look at father's
education.

28

REFERENCES

Aschenbrenner, Joyce. 1973. Extended Families among Black Americans.
Journal of Comparative Family Studies 4: 257-68.
Auletta~ Ken.

1982.

The Underclass.

New York:

Random House.

Bernard, Jessie. 1966. Marriage and Family among Negroes.
C1 it ts: Prentice-Ha I 1, Inc.

Englewood

Bianchi, Suzanne M. and Reynolds Farley. 1979. Racial Differences in
Family Living Arrangements and Economic Well-Being: An Analysis of
Recent Trends. Journal of Marriage and the Family 41 (August):
-

537-551.

-

Bloom, David E. 1982. What's Happening to the Age at First Birth in
the United States? Demography 19(3): 351-370.
_______________ , and Neil G. Bennett. 1985. Marriage Patterns in the
United States. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper
Series, No. 1147. Cambridge, MA.
___________ ~--' and James Trussell. 1984. What are the Determinants
of Delayed Childbearing and Pe~manent Childlessness in the United
States? Demography 21(4): 591-611.
The Center tor the Study of Social Policy. 1984. The "Flip-Side" of
Black Families Headed by Women: The Economic Status of Black Men.
Washington, DC.
Cherlin, Andrew J. 1981.
Harvard Univeristy Press.
Coale, Anlsey J.
25:

1971.

Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage.
Age Patterns of Marriage.

Cambridge:

Population Studies

193-214.

Cox, Oliver. 1940. Sex Ratios and Marital Status among Negros.
American Sociological Review 5: 937-947.
Danziger, Sheldon, George Jakubson, Saul Schwartz, and Eugene Smolensky.
1982. Work and Welfare as Dete~minants of Female Poverty and Household
Headship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97 {August): 519-534.
Darity, William Jr., and Samuel Myers, Jr. 1983. Changes in Black
Family Structure: Implications for Welfare Dependency. American
Economic Review 73(2): 59-64.
Espenshade, Thomas. 1985. Marriage Trends in America: Estimates, ,
Implications and Causes. Population and Development Review 11(2): · 193245.

29

Ewbank, Douglas. 1974. An Examination of Several Applications of the
St~ndard Pattern of Age atFirst Marriage'-:- Unpublisned Ph.D.
- -
Dissertation, Princeton Univers1ty.
Farley, Reynolds.
University Press.

1984.

Blacks and Whites.

Cambridge:

_________________ , and Suzanne M. Bianchi.
1983.
between Blacks. American Demographics 5(7): 14-18.
Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr.
Free Press.

1976.

Glasgow, Douglas G. 1980.
Jossey-Bass Publishers.

The Black Underclass.

Harvard
The Growing Gap

Unpianned Parenthood.

New York:

San Francisco:

Glick, Paul. 1981. A Demographic Picture of Black Families.
(ed.), Black Families.
Guttentag, Marcia, and Paul F. Secord. 1983. Too Many Women?
Ratio aue·st ion. Bever I y Hi 11 s: Sage Pub 1 i cat iori's.-Harrington, Michael.

1985.

The

In McAdoo
The Sex

The New American Poverty.
--------

Heisse, Jerold. 1975. The Case of the Black Family:
Inquiry. New York: Columbia University Press.

A Sociological

Harnes, Gudmund. 1~72. The Process of Entry into First Marriage.
American Sociological Review 37: 173-182.
Hil I, Robert B. 1972. The Strength of Black Families.
York: Emerson Hal 1 Publ 1sher, Inc.

New

Hogan, Dennis P. and Evelyn Kitagawa. 1985. The Impact of Social
Status, Family Structure, and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black
Adolescents. American Journal of Sociology 90(4): 825-855.
Jackson, Jacqueline.
(December): 30-41.

1971.

But Where are the Men?

Black Scholar 3

Johnson, Nan E. 1979. Minority-~roup Status and the Fertility of Black
Americans, 1970: A New Look. American Journal of Sociology 84(6):
1386-1400.
Keeley, Michael C. 1979. An Analysis of the Age Pattern of First
Marriage. International Economic Review 20(2): 527-544.
Kitagawa, Evelyn. 1981. New Life-styles: Marriage Patterns, Living
Arrangements, and Fertility Outside of Marriage. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 4~(JanuaryT:-r=-15.

Martin, Elmer, and Joanne Mitchell Martin. 1978.
Family. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

30

The Black Extended

McAdoo, Ha rrie tte (ed .),
Pu bli cat ion s, Inc .

Bla ck Fam ilie s.

198 1.

Bev erly Hi lls :

Sage

bil ity in upw ard ly Mo bile
197 8. Fac tor s Rel ate d to Sta
-76 .
rria ge and the Fam ily 40: 761
Bla ck Fam ilie s. Jou rna l of Ma
Am eric a.
the Ga unt let: Bla ck Men in
g
nin
Run
4.
198
D.
es
Jam
McGhee,
Urban Lea gue .
Wa snin gto n, DC: The Na tion al
ilie s:
Ad apt atio n of Urb an Bla ck Fam
McOueen, Alb ert J. 197 8. The ss and Hoffman (ed .), The Am eric an
Rei
Tre nds , Pro ble ms, Iss ues . In
ss.
Pre
Fam ily. New York: Ple num
198 1.
ra Ste mp el, and Oze r Bab ako l.
Deb
ll,
sse
Tru
es
Jam
A.,
e
Jan
aly sis of
MenKen,
le Mo del s: An Ill ust rat ive An
Un ited
Pro por tio nal Haz ard s Lif e Tab
the
in
on
on Ma rria ge Dis sol uti
Soc io-D em ogr aph ic Inf lue nce s
-20 0.
Sta tes . Demography 18: 181
Lec tur es,
Fam ily and Na tion . The Godkin
Mo yni han , Dan iel P. 198 5.
.
Har var d Un ive rsit y, Ap ril 8-9
e for Nat ion al
196 5. The Negro Fam ily- -Th e Cas
ear ch, U.S.
ice of Pol icy Pla nni ng and Res
Ac tion . Wa shi ngt on, DC: Off
Dep artm ent of Lab or.
: 196 4Economic Exp erie nce of Bla cks
8.
5-1
Mu nne ll, Ali cia H. 197 8. The
y:
uar
ebr
Eco nom ics, Jan uar y/F
197 4. New Eng lan d Jou rna l of
Fin al
s. 198 5. Advance Rep ort of
tic
tis
Sta
alth
He
for
ter
Cen
Nat ion al
, Vol . 34,
nth ly Vit al Sta tis tic s Rep ort
Ma rria ge Sta .tis tic s, 198 2. Mo MD: Puo lic Re altn Ser vic e.
,
No. 3, Sup ple me nt. Hy att svi lle
an Rep ort and
L. Yancey. 196 7. The Moynih
Rai nw ate r, Lee , and Wi llia m
ss.
Pre
:-T.
Cam brid ge: The M:Y
the Po liti cs of Co ntr ove rsy .
n Bu lle tin
eric a in the 198 0's . Pop ula tio
Rei d, Joh n. 198 2. Bla ck Am
.
eau
ula tion Ref ere nce Bur
37( 4). Wa shi ngt on, DC: Pop
ns of
rnto n, 198 5. Cha ngi ng Pat ter
Tho
and
Arl
and
C.,
d
llar
Wi
-79 .
Rod ger s,
Sta tes . Demography 22( 2): 265
Fir st Ma rria ge in the Un ited
elih ood
Tru sse ll. 198 0, Maximum Lik
Rod rigu ez, German, and James
edu le from
Sch
ty
ali
pti
of Co ale 's Model Nu
lity
Est ima tion of the Par am ete rs
rti
Fe
rJd
Wo
tin No. ·7. Lon don :
Sur vey Da ta. Tec hni cal Bu lle
Sur vey .
nsi tio n:
v. Saw hill . 197 5. Time of: Tra
urDan
Ros s, Hea the r L., and Isa bel
The
-oe
by Women. Wa shi ngt on;
The Growth of Fam ilie s Headed
Ins titu te.
in the
We sto ff. 197 1. Rep rod uct ion
Ryd er, Norman B., and Ch arle s
ss.
ton : Pri nce ton Un ive rsit y Pre
Un ited Sta tes , 196 5. Pri nce
tor s. 197 8.
mk in, and Den nis A. i=r ate , £di
Shimi<in, De! llit: -i, £di tn M, Shi
.
So cie tie s. The Hag ue: Mouton
The Ext eno ed Fam ily in Bla ck

-- -

31

··--···

·- -- -- -

Stack, Carol B.

1974.

All Our Kin.

New York: Harper and Row.

Teachman, Jay D., ano Karen Polonko. 1984. Out of Sequence: The
Timing of Marriage Following a Premarital Birth. Social Forces 63
(Septemoer): 245-249.
Thornton, Arland, and Deborah Freedman. 1983. The Changing American
Family. Population Bulletin 38 (October). Washington, DC: Population
Reference Bureau.
Tienda, Marta, and Ronald Angel. 1982. Headship and Household
Composition among Blacks, Hispanics and Other Whites. Social Forces
61 (2): 508-31.
Trussell, James. 1980. Illustrative Analysis: Age at First Marriage
in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Scientific Reports No. 13. London: World
Fertility Survey.
_______________ , and David E. Bloom. 1983. Estimating the Covariates
of Age at Marriage and First Birth. Population Studies 37(3): 403-416.
Wilson, William J. 1985. The Urban Underclass, Social Dislocation, and
Public Policy. Forthcoming in Leslie Dunbar (ed.), American Minorities
and Civil Rights: Where Now and Where Headed. New York: Pantheon.
1978 . . The Declini~g Sigificance of Race.
_______________ __
- -Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zelnik, Melvin, and John F. Kantner. 1977. Sexual and Contraceptive
of Young Unmarried Women in the United States: 1976 and 1971.
Family Planning Perspectives 9(2): 55-71.

32

PROPORTIONS MARRYING AT A GIVrn AGE:
FOUR SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS
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25-29

30-34

12:12.

40-44

45-49

~

1Q:l:.

12:12.

~

~

Constant

19. 71

19.78

19.74

19.61

19.84

21.06

20.25

21.04

21.60

21.23

Ed• HS

l.58

1.23

1.31

1.19

1.37

1.15

1.08

1;17

1.56

1.82

2.02

1.58

2.11

4.46

4.07

. 4.61

5.33

5.00

Ed> HS
HS< Ed< College

2.56

2.17

2.09

1.59

1.79

Ed

4.13

3.34

3.09

3.05

3.11

3.86

3.57

3.77

3.53

3.67

;;i,

College

I

Constant

.51*

1.61

Constant

.931

.937

.945

.951

.973

.568

.764

.807

.888

.888

Ed• HS

.001•

.017*

.022

.023

.004*

.096

.005*

.043*

.028*

.Q36•

.042*

.066*

.126

.046*

.069

Ed> HS
HS< Ed< College

- .058

- .029

Ed

- .152

- .095

;;i,

College

-.003*

.008*
- .029

- .039

- .015*
- .067

*Coefficient not significant at the .OS level.

MARRIAGE PROBABILITIES FOR NEVER-MARRIED
. WOMEN AGED 25-29 IN 1~2

0.9
0.8
0.7

s
CD

<

CD

0.6
0.5

0

8:

0.4

0.3

~

0.2

~~
~!ECD.15'.I:
El.JO< IJ' tOi S:J-Ol.

0.1

El.JO< GT l-0! s:HXL

0

I

15

20

25

30

AGE
FIGURE 2
···---···-

- - - - ·-------·---- ----·-·

....

---- --

35

40

45

Table 2 -- Probability that a WOllllln vho has never married by
exact age.!. vill ultimately marry for women aged
25-29 and 45-49 in 1982

25-29
~

~

Age

X

15
20
25
30
35
40
45

Ed<HS

Ed-'College

.928
.838
.557
.223
.061
.014
.003

• 779
• 756
.517
.202
.054
.013
.003

Ed<HS

Ed>HS

.562
.405
.i74
.056
.016
.004
.001

.568
.477
.237
.081
.024
.007
.002

45-49
Black

White
Age x
15
20
25
30
35
40
45

···---

·-·--- .... -----

..

---

...

-----

Ed<HS

Ed,i,college

.972
.935
.765
.408
.126
.029
.006

.. · · · - - - - ' - - - , - -

.906
.885
.690
.324
.092
.021
.004

Ed<HS

Ed>HS

.884
.805
.595
.321
.131
.045
.014

.95.7
.942
.867
.682
.406
.176
.060

-

-- Trends and Dlfferentlals ln Black and Whlte Unemploya,ent and Earalngs Experience

~

A.

20-24 year-old•

u

~

~

~

~

.0474*
(2.37)

9.60*
(340)

9.37*
(159)

9.47*
(257}

9.26*
(144)

.0299
(1.39)

.0170
(.69)

-.0097
(.-.28)

.0219
(1.02)

.0685*
(2 .81)

-.121*
(-3.68)
.0150
(-.44)

.1!:!.ill_.

~

Intercept

.0577*
(3.26)

llace•l\lack
Ed<HS

Ed-HS
!lace

X

Ed<HS

llace x Ed•HS

.0170
(.37}

-.0974
(-1 .22)

-.409*
(-5.70)

. *
-.137
(-2.99)

-.483*
(-6.06)

-.134+
(-1.86)

.0292
(.64)

-.147+
(-1.85)

-.107
(-1 .49)

-.0088
(-.41)

.0046
(.19)

-.0379
(-1.25)

.0867*
(2.51)

-.210*
(-5.56)

-.0232
(-.23)

-.262*
(-4 .06)

-.0753
(-.67)

-.0243
(-.80)

.0319
(.92)

-.n8*
(-2 .83)

.0187
(.18)

-.160*
(-2.47)

-.0286
(- .25)

.0088*
(3 .69)

-.0180*
(-2.97)

,0066

-.0261*
(-5.51)

-.0059

(.94)

,0015
(.18)
-.0019
(-.23)

.0010*

Race x Tune

log[£ (1-U)]

log E

(3 .35)

(-.72)

Ed-:HS x Tlme

,0089*
(4.25)

.0059*
(2.49)

-.0052
(-1.56)

.0084
(1.19)

-.0180*
(-3 .80)

Ed-HS x Tlme

.0043*
(2 .OJ)

.0027
(1.12)

-.0047
(-1 .40)

.0003
(.05)

-.0105*
(-2.23)

Race x Ed<HS x Tlme

.0051+
(1, 71)

.0005
(.14)

.0110*
(2.32)

-.0024
(-.24)

,0092
(1.38)

-.0135
(-1.16)

.0073
(1.08)

-.0043
(-.37)

llace

X

Ed-HS

X

Tlme

R2

.0020
(.67)

-.0009
(-.27)

.0039
(,82)

-.0054
(-.54)

.930

.936

.986

.953

B.

Race•Black

log E

Ed-HS
llace x Ed<HS
llace

X

Ed-HS

Race x· Time

Ed<HS x Time
Ed•HS

X

Tl.me

log{E(l-U)J

.l!!!!.!...

~

~

~

9_93*
(360)

9.10*
(301)

9.8o*
(265)

9.62*
(222)

-,194*
(-5.76)

-.0122+
(-1 .84)

-.0110*
(-3.70)

-.450

.0462*
(2.03)

-.292*
(-8.67)

-.467*
(-11.9)

•• 302*
(-6.58)

-.s10*
(-9.47)

-.0088
(-.55)

.0146
(.64)

-.138*
(-4.11)

-,244*
(-6.22)

-.119*
(-2.59)

-.268*
(-4.97)

.0086
(.38)

-.0056
(-.18)

-.116*
(-2.44)

-,173*
(-3.12)

-.138*
(-2.12)

-.153*
(-2 .40)

-.0211
(-.44)

-.0738
(-1.33)

-.0629
(-.97)

-.0625
(-.82)

-.0004
(-.10)

-.0067
(-1.42)

- .0083
(-1 .48)

-.0024
(-.73)

-.0010
(-.27)

-.0120*
(-2 .53)

-.0056
(-1 .01)

-.0038
(-.81)

.0015
( .27)

,.!!!!!!_

!'.!!!!.w.

.0371*
(2 .82)

.0417*
(2.23)

-.0124
(-.77)
.0218
(1,3.6)

Ed<HS

.947

25-29 year-olds

u

Intercept

.974

-.0023
(-.10)

.0291
(1.28)

,0060
(.19)

.0012*
(4.57)

.0053*
(2 .41)

.0010*
(4 .48)

.0054*
(2.42)

.0042*
(2.68)

.0018
(.80)

.0018
(.54)

.0025
(.64)

.0021
(-.64)

(-.84)

Race x Ed<HS x Time

-.0008
(-.35)

.0067*
(2.12)

.0022
(.46)

.0139*
(2.56)

,0039
(.59)

.0063
(.80)

Race x Ed•HS x Time

-.0017
(-.78) ·

.0018
(.56)

.0008
(.18)

.0075
(1.39)

,0033
(.49)

.0034
(.43)

.933

.898

.988

.987

.976

.976

1.2

**Data dravn fr0111 the 1968-1984 Harch Current Population Surveys; ordinary least squares estlmates;
t•statlstics in parenthesea.
·*
+Coefficient significant at the .OS level.
Coefficient 1lgnlficant at the .10 level.

Table 4--Percentage of women (classified by age and race), with mother
of educational attainment less than or more than high school,
who had a premarital first birth.*

White

Black
Ed<HS

--

Ed>HS

--

Ed<HS

--

Ed>HS
-

15-19

1.6
(244)

-0=
(119)

4,0
(300)

0.5
( 368")

20-24

16.7
(276)

8.8
( 125)

9.0
( 199)

3.5
(228)

25-29

28.2
( 376)

18.8
(101)

6.8

(236)

1.9
( 160)

30-34

29.3
(334)

13. 1
(84)

. 7. 7
( 2 71 )

4.9
( 143)

35-39

25.3
( 245)

22.2
(27)

6.5

(216)

3.2
(93)

32.7
(223)

26.1
(23)

3.3
(239)

2.8
( 72)

40-44

*Percentages are derived from Cycle III of the National Survey
of Family Growth, conducted in 1982. The number of mothers in each
educational attainment category is reported within ~arentheses.

